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 1 
Antitrust: What Counts as Consumer Welfare? 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
 The antitrust laws speak in unmistakably economic terms about 
the conduct they prohibit.  The Sherman Act is directed toward 
conduct that “restrains trade” or “monopolizes” markets.1  The Clayton 
Act prohibits conduct whose effect may be substantially to “lessen 
competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”2  Even so, economic 
effects can be measured in different ways.  The dominant view of 
antitrust law today is its rules should be based on a “consumer welfare” 
principle.  We assume that consumers are best off when prices are low.  
Dissenters on the right would include seller profits in their conception 
of consumer welfare.  Those on the left would expand antitrust to 
incorporate political goals, pursue large firm size or industrial 
concentration for its own sake, or include effects such as wealth or 
social inequality. 
 A statement released by the Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force 
in July, 2020, speaks about the need for greater antitrust enforcement 
in several areas.3  It expresses concern about health care mergers that 
raise price, an acknowledged problem that clearly falls within the 
consumer welfare principle.4  It does the same thing for 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law 
School and The Wharton School. 
1 15 U.S.C. §1 (prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. §2 (prohibiting those who monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize commerce). 
2All three substantive antitrust sections of the Clayton Act prohibit the 
conduct they cover when it threatens to “substantially … lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly.”  See 15 U.S.C. §13 (price discrimination); 15 
U.S.C. §14 (tying and exclusive dealing); 15 U.S.C. §18 (mergers). 
3Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations (July 8, 2020), 
available at https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UNITY-
TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf. 
4 Id. at 33. 
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anticompetitive outcomes in agricultural processing.5  More 
problematically, it would “Charge antitrust regulators with 
systematically incorporating broader criteria into their analytical 
considerations, including in particular the impact of corporate 
consolidation on the labor market, underserved communities, and 
racial equity.”6  It also speaks of reversing the impact of Trump-
administration mergers “to repair the damage done to working people 
and to reverse the impact on racial inequity.”7 
 
 The temptation to use antitrust to achieve broader goals is 
understandable.  The broad and brief language of the antitrust laws 
incorporate an elastic mandate and is directed at the courts.  They can 
become a vehicle for achieving goals through the judicial system that 
are more difficult to achieve legislatively.  By contrast, the consumer 
welfare principle is a way of limiting the scope of antitrust to a set of 
economic goals with consumers identified as the principal 
beneficiaries. 
 Most descriptions of the consumer welfare principle refer to 
prices: the goal of the antitrust laws should be to combat monopolistic 
prices. Articulating the goal in this way raises conceptual problems 
when we think about suppliers.  For example, the antitrust concern 
with labor is with wage suppression, which means that wages are 
anticompetitively low.  This can collide with a common 
misperception, which is that low wages invariably produce low 
consumer prices. 
 One thing that buyers and sellers have in common, however, is 
that both are injured by anticompetitive output reductions.  Price and 
output move in opposite directions.  While monopoly involves prices 
that are too high and monopsony (monopoly buying) involves prices 
that are too low, both require lower output.  As a result, when consumer 
 
5Id. at 52, 68. 
6Id. at 67. 
7Id. at 74. 
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welfare is articulated in terms of output rather than price, it protects 
both buyers and sellers, including sellers of their labor. 
 There are other reasons for preferring output rather than price 
as the primary indicator of consumer welfare.  In most markets, firms 
have more control over output than they do over price.  This is most 
true in competitive markets, although it is less true as markets are more 
monopolized.  A seller in a perfectly competitive market lacks any 
control over price bu t usually has full control over output.  A corn 
farmer cannot meaningfully ask “what price should I charge” for this 
year’s crop.  She will charge the market price.  While she has the power 
to charge less, she has no incentive to do so because she can sell all 
she produces at the market price.  The one absolute power she does 
have, however, is to determine output.  The decision whether to plant 
1000 acres in corn, 500, 100 acres or even zero is entirely hers and 
depends only on her capacity to produce. 
 The consumer welfare principle in antitrust is best understood 
as pursuing maximum output consistent with sustainable competition.  
In a competitive market this occurs when prices equal marginal cost.  
More practically and in real world markets, it tries to define and 
identify anticompetitive practices as ones that reduce market wide 
output below the competitive level.  Output can go higher than the 
competitive level, but then at least some prices would have to be below 
cost.  As a result, the definition refers to “sustainable” but competitive 
levels of output.  If output is too high some firms will be losing money 
and must eventually raise their prices or exit. 
 Consumer welfare measured as output serves the customer’s 
interest in low prices and also in markets that produce as wide a variety 
of goods and services as a competition can offer.  It also serves the 
interest of labor, which is best off when production is highest.  
Concurrently, it benefits input suppliers and other participants in the 
market process.  For example, if the output of toasters increases, 
consumers benefit from the lower prices.  Labor benefits because more 
toaster production increases the demand for labor.  Retailers, suppliers 
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of electric components, shipping companies, taxing authorities and 
virtually everyone with a stake in the production of toasters benefits as 
well. 
 Antitrust is a microeconomic discipline, concerned with the 
performance of individual markets rather than the economy as a whole.  
It is worth noting, however, that a goal of high output in a particular 
market contributes to a well-functioning overall economy.  For 
example, macroeconomic measures such as GDP are based on the 
aggregate production of goods and services in the entire economy 
under consideration.  All else being equal, when a particular good or 
service market experiences larger competitive output the overall 
economy will benefit as well.8  That issue would almost never be 
relevant in any particular antitrust case, but it can be important at the 
legislative or policy level.  Increasingly people have observed a link 
between competition policy – particularly high price-cost margins – 
and the performance of the economy as a whole.9 
 What is not included in consumer welfare under the antitrust 
laws?  First, bigness itself is not an antitrust issue unless it leads to 
reduced output in some market.  That is, the consumer welfare 
principle is consistent with very large firms.  It favors economies of 
scale and scope.10  To be sure, very large firms can injure small firms 
 
8 For a good introduction to these issues, see JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER AND 
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE ENDLESS CRISIS: HOW MONOPOLY-FINANCE 
CAPITAL PRODUCES STAGNATION AND UPHEAVAL FROM THE USA TO 
CHINA (2017). 
9For good commentary, see Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial 
Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My 
Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
212, 219-225 (2016); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Letivin, Considering Law 
and Macroeconomics, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2020); Chad Syverson, 
Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open 
Questions, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2019) Tay-Cheng Ma, Antitrust and 
Democracy: Perspectives from Efficiency and Equity, 12 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 233 (2016). 
10 An economy of scale is a cost that declines as a firm produces a larger 
amount.  An economy of scope is a cost that declines as someone produces a 
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that have higher costs or lower quality products.  The impact of the 
consumer welfare principle on small firms is complex, however, and 
requires close analysis of individual cases.  While small competitors 
of a large low cost and high output firm can be injured, many other 
small firms benefit, including suppliers and retailers.  A good 
illustration is Amazon, which is a very large firm that generally sells 
at low prices and has maintained high consumer satisfaction.11  
Amazon has undoubtedly injured many small firms forced to compete 
with its prices and distribution.  At the same time, however, Amazon 
acts as broker for millions of small firms who use its retail distribution 
services.12  When a very large firm produces more, it creates 
opportunities for other firms that sell complements, that distribute the 
products that a large firm produces, or that supply it with inputs.  So 
once again it is important not to paint with too broad a brush.  Blowing 
up Amazon could ruin many small businesses. 
 As for labor and antitrust, that relationship is also complex and 
has changed over time.  During the early years of Sherman Act 
enforcement organized labor was widely believed to be a source of 
monopoly.  Many of the earliest antitrust criminal prosecutions were 
directed at labor unions.13  For example, Eugene Debs went to prison 
in 1895 as a result of a conviction under the Sherman Act.14  Congress 
 
larger variety of products, or in a larger number of places.  For example, 
because of joint costs a firm might be able to produce toasters and space 
heaters out of the same plant more cheaply than two firms that each produced 
one of the two products. 
11See Jon Markman, How Amazon.com Remains the Ruler of Retail, FORBES 
(Jan. 30, 2020) (Amazon #1 in consumer satisfaction for three consecutive 
years). 
12For statistics, see https://www.feedbackexpress.com/amazon-1029528-
new-sellers-year-plus-
stats/#:~:text=Amazon%20US%20stats,and%20more%20than%2060%20c
ountries. (last visited July 20, 2020) (noting that Amazon has 5 million 
independent sellers, with 1.7 million currently listing products for sale). 
13See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988). 
14See in re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 596-600 (1895); and Hovenkamp, Labor 
Conspiracies, id. at 920. 
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came to labor’s rescue during the New Deal,15 and the result was the 
development of a complex labor immunity that today reaches even 
agreements among employers, provided that they are part of the 
collective bargaining process.16 
 But years of anti-union activity largely deprived the unions of 
the economic power and turned the tables.  Most of the antitrust 
concerns about labor today are with anticompetitive practices that 
suppress wages, not with worker power to extract higher wages.17  
Agreements among employers not to hire away one another employees 
(“anti-poaching” agreements) are unlawful per se.18  Today a fair 
amount of litigation is directed at overly broad use of labor 
noncompetition agreements, which are formally vertical but subject to 
antitrust attack when they are used by many firms in a market to 
impede worker mobility.19 
 
15Id. at 928, 929, 962. 
16Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (extending labor antitrust 
immunity to agreement among multiple NFL team owners involved in 
collective bargaining).  See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶255-257 (5th ed. 2020). 
17See Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in 
Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031 (2019); Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition 
Policy for Labour Markets, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs (5 June 2019), available at 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)67/en/pdf.  See also 
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor 
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537 (2018). 
18See the Justice Department’s statement, “No More No-Poach: The Antitrust 
Division Continues to Investigate and Prosecute “No Poach” and wage-
Fixing Agreements,” available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-
operations/division-update-spring-2018/antitrust-division-continues-
investigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wage-fixing-
agreements#:~:text=When%20companies%20agree%20not%20to,compete
%20for%20those%20employees'%20labor.&text=Naked%20no%2Dpoach
%20and%20wage,product%20prices%20or%20allocate%20customers. 
(spring 2018). 
19E.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL  3105955 (N.D. Ill. 
June 25, 2018) (parallel use of noncompetition agreements among 
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Are there situations in which a practice that the consumer 
welfare principle would approve might nevertheless harm labor?  Yes, 
when the practice in question reduces the demand for labor as a result 
of cost savings rather than a decrease in output. Consider the merger 
between Chrysler and Jeep, two producers of automobiles.20  The 
merger was small as automobile mergers go and was lawful under the 
antitrust laws.  Nevertheless, a likely result of such a merger would be 
consolidation of dealerships and some elimination of duplicate jobs.  
After the merger it is cheaper for Chrysler and better for consumers if 
Chryslers and Jeeps are sold through a common dealership.  Sales and 
service can be performed by a common staff, reducing the number of 
employees to less than the number required by two separate facilities.  
At the same time, however, the overall automobile market remains 
competitive on both the consumer side and the input (labor) side.  To 
the extent this consolidation reduces Chrysler/Jeep’s costs, output of 
automobiles would go up. 
Consolidations can reduce the demand for labor even though 
the firms could not possibly injure competition in any market.  For 
example, if two pediatricians in New York City should form a 
partnership they might decide to share a single secretary or assistant.  
A job would be eliminated, but without any competitive harm to any 
market.  So the consumer welfare principle does not condemn every 
practice that reduces the demand for labor, but only those practices that 
do so monopolistically, by suppressing the demand for labor rather 
than by reducing the amount of it that a firm needs.  It is not antitrust’s 
purpose to subsidize employment by requiring firms to use employees 
that they do not need.  The merger that reduces the demand for labor 
through efficient consolidation is no different in principle than any 
 
McDonald’s franchsees).  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.1d (6th ed. 2020). 
20The acquisition, which occurred in 1987, was with American Motors, 
which at that time had already acquired Jeep.  See “Chrysler is Bying 
American Motors,” NEW YORK TIMES (March 10, 1987), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/10/business/chrysler-is-buying-
american-motors-cost-is-1.5-billion.html. 
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other production change that requires less labor – for example, when a 
manufacturer shifts from a labor intensive assembly process to a more 
automated one that requires fewer employees. 
 If we really wanted to protect jobs from all changes that reduce 
the demand for employment we would do better to change the patent 
laws rather than antitrust law.  Changes in technology almost certainly 
have greater and more explicit effects on labor than do mergers or 
other procompetitive antitrust practices.  For example, a “Job 
Protection from Innovation Act” might provide that patent applications 
must show as a condition of patentability that their invention will not 
lead to a loss of jobs.  No one advocates for such a statute because its 
economically harmful implications are too clear. 
 Distinguishing pro- from anti-competitive reductions in labor 
is not always easy. Most of the time the difference can be inferred from 
market structure.  For example, if two small firms in a large field merge 
and eliminate a certain number of duplicate jobs, the reason is highly 
likely to be more efficient use of resources.  As the employee-side 
market share of the two firms becomes larger, however, 
anticompetitive explanations become more plausible.  Then it becomes 
necessary for a tribunal to investigate whether efficient consolidation 
or inefficient labor suppression is going on.21 
 
 
 
21Cf. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 371-374 (D.C.Cir. 2018) 
(then Circuit judge Kavanaugh, dissenting, noting dispute about whether 
lower provider rates result from hospital merger would result from increase 
efficiency or anticompetitive suppression of input prices).  See also Elena 
Prager & Matthew Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence 
from Hospitals (SSRN working paper Jun 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3391889 (citing 
evidence that hospital mergers in concentrated markets can result in wage 
suppression for employees such as nurses and that the dominant explanation 
if employer power over labor). 
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Getting to Consumer Welfare 
 Antitrust policy has not always articulated a consumer welfare 
principle.  It is largely a creature of the 1960s and after.22  Historically, 
economists almost always used “welfare” to describe “general” or 
“total” welfare, which was the welfare of all participants in the 
economy.  For example, Pareto optimality assesses equally everyone 
who is affected by an economic action, producers as well as 
consumers.  The same thing is true of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which 
assesses welfare changes by comparing the welfare of all gainers 
against the welfare of all losers.  A change is a welfare improvement 
if the gainers gain enough to compensate fully the losers out of their 
gains.23 
Oliver Williamson advocated a so-called “welfare tradeoff” 
model for antitrust in the 1960s,24 and Robert Bork popularized it in 
the 1970s.25 The Williamson proposal was a variant of the total welfare 
model.  It proclaimed an antitrust practice such as a merger to be 
competitively harmful if the welfare losses that it produced exceeded 
any welfare gains.26  Bork in particular used the model to offset gains 
 
22Robert Bork used the term in 1960s, but in a way that referred to general 
welfare.  See Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer 
Welfare I, 74 YALE L.J 775 (1965); & II, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1968); 
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing 
and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1965).  The phrase had a few 
earlier uses, but none that became popular.  Perhaps the most important is 
Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. 
REV. 77 84 (1954) (monopoly harms consumer welfare).  See also Covey T. 
Oliver, The Fair Trade Acts, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1939) (arguing that resale 
price maintenance (“fair trade”) harms consumer welfare). 
23See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Jules L. 
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the 
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980). 
24Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
25ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 107-112 (1978). 
26Bork, id. at 107 (discussing Williamson, supra note __ at 21). 
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and losses as between consumers and producers, not giving much 
attention to effects on third parties. 
One particularly damaging feature of the welfare tradeoff 
model was that a relatively small profit increase for producers was 
sufficient to offset rather large price increases to consumers.  As a 
result, even practices that raised price significantly were thought to 
promote welfare.  For example, Williamson concluded that under 
typical assumptions about elasticities of demand a cost reduction of 
1% - 4% would be sufficient to offset a price increase of about 20%.27  
“More generally it is evident that a relatively modest cost reduction is 
usually sufficient to offset relatively large price increases.”28  This led 
Williamson to conclude that “a merger which yields non- trivial real 
economies must produce substantial market power and result in 
relatively large price increases for the net allocative effects to be 
negative.”29  What he did not acknowledge was the severe 
measurement difficulties that would accompany most attempts to 
measure the size of welfare gains against welfare losses. 
Williamson did acknowledge that a merger or other practice 
that resulted in both efficiencies and a price increase would also reduce 
output.  That is true of any price-increasing practice.  However, he did 
not consider where these efficiencies would come from. Two of the 
most important sources of efficiency are economies of scale in 
production and purchasing economies for inputs.  However, these 
occur only at higher rates of output and, thus, of purchasing.  So the 
fact that output goes down takes away the most important sources of 
efficiencies. To be sure, there are exceptions that can result from 
reorganization of production.  For example, suppose one merging firm 
is producing 50 washers and 50 dryers at an inefficiently low rate and 
the other merging firm is also producing 50 washers and dryers 
inefficiently.  After the merger the two firms might be able to switch 
 
27 Williamson, Economies, supra note__  at 22. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Id. at 23. 
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their production so that all of the washers are produced in one plant 
and all of the dryers in the other.  Further, it might reduce output to 90 
units of each, reflecting its increased market power, and still produce 
them more efficiently than it did before.  But this would require not 
merely a merger but also significant reorganization or production. 
Some efficiencies are so substantial that post-merger prices are 
lower than they were prior to the merger.   In that case, however, there 
is nothing to trade off.  That merger would be lawful under the 
consumer welfare test because it benefits rather than harms consumers.  
The Government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines take this approach, 
permitting an efficiencies defense to a merger only if efficiencies are 
so significant that output is at least as high after the merger as before.30  
Other types of efficiencies can conceivably be attained at lower 
output levels, such as increased technological complementarity, access 
to IP portfolios, or redeployment of management.  But merger law also 
requires that these efficiencies be “merger specific,” which means that 
they cannot reasonably be attained except through merger.31  Talent 
can be hired and IP can be licensed.  In sum, the range of merger 
specific efficiencies that can result from an output reducing practice is 
very likely extremely small. 
Bork’s approach to the welfare tradeoff problem was also 
unique in another and quite damaging way.  He disagreed with 
Williamson about the wisdom of measuring a welfare tradeoff, 
asserting that efficiencies simply cannot be measured.  Using 
economies of scale as an example, he concluded that the problem of 
efficiency measurement is “utterly insoluble.”32  Rather, efficiencies 
should be taken on faith.  When market power is completely lacking 
efficiencies can be inferred, because they are the only explanation that 
 
30Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines §10 (August, 2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010. 
31Ibid. 
32BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note __ at 126. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656702
12 Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare July. 2020 
 
makes a practice profitable.  For example, when the two New York 
pediatricians form a partnership and move into a single building they 
could not be exercising market power. Their union is profitable only if 
it reduces costs or improves the quality of their services.  But that 
argument falls apart in the presence of any amount of market power. 
Then the action can be profitable if it either reduces costs or raises 
prices to noncompetitive levels. 
Importantly, however, Bork’s idea that efficiencies are 
impossible to measure permits someone to look at the alarming 
increase in price-cost margins over the last several decades and dismiss 
them as reflecting nothing more than efficiencies – simply by not 
requiring evidence.  Under Bork’s tutelage we have seen a dramatic 
rise in margins, and thus in the presence of monopoly power, over the 
past forty years. 
 Bork also did antitrust an important disservice by naming his 
version of the welfare tradeoff approach “consumer welfare,” even 
though it expressly took into account the combined welfare of 
consumers and producers.33  That conception of “consumer welfare” 
haunts antitrust to this day.  Under it, for example, the dissenters in the 
Supreme Court’s Actavis decision could speak of antitrust as adhering 
to a consumer welfare principle even as they would have approved a 
practice (pay-for-delay) that resulted in very substantially higher 
prices to consumers.34  Or in the American Express decision the 
majority could profess adherence the consumer welfare principle even 
as they were approving a practice that resulted in higher consumer 
 
33See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the 
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 836 (2014) (“Bork shifted 
from consumer welfare to total welfare without changing labels, hence 
equating antitrust policy with efficiency while continuing to package it in a 
consumer welfare pill that courts would easily swallow.”) 
34See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas).  
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prices every time it was applied.35  In both cases the practice was 
highly profitable to producers, and that was all that mattered. 
Conclusion: Maximum Sustainable Output 
 We live in an era when monopoly profits are very high,36 when 
labor’s share of the returns to production has declined sharply,37 when 
overall economic growth is significantly smaller than it was in the mid-
twentieth century,38 and economic inequality is near an all-time high.39  
Antitrust is not a cure-all for these problems, but it does have its role.  
It does best when it sticks to its economic purposes and lets other 
legislative agendas handle the rest.  Even so, pushing output back up 
to competitive levels can do a great deal of good and, along with other 
policy choices, can assist in addressing all of these problems. 
 
 
35 Ohio v. American Express, 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (Thomas, j., for 
the majority).  See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 
__, §10.10.  The challenged practice forbad merchants from offering 
customers a lower price in exchange for using a cheaper credit card. 
36See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market 
Structure and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
37David Autor, et al, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM 
ECON REV: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 180, 181-83 (2017). 
38See https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth-annual. 
39See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2d ed. 2018). 
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